How widespread is the usage of the Northern Sea Route as a commercially viable shipping route? A statistical analysis of ship transits from 2011 to 2018 based on empirical data by Rajagopal, Siram & Zhang, Pengfei
Northern Sea Route in shipping: How far is it from being widely adopted? 
 
Abstract 
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a shipping route running from the Barents Sea, near Russia's border 
with Norway, to the Bering Strait between Siberia and Alaska. Melting Arctic ice caps are likely to 
increase traffic in and the commercial viability of the Northern Sea Route. It is expected to become a 
commercial alternative to the existing shipping network, which is defined by international trading patterns 
and population centres. However, there is a lack of substantial research on the development and prospect 
of the utilisation of the NSR. When the NSR can attain mainstream usage remains unexplored. Based on 
the existing knowledge and scholarship available in the public domain, together with data collected from 
Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA) and Equasis database, this paper critically examines the 
usage of the NSR between 2011 and 2017, and the major factors preventing its wide adoption. It is found 
in this study that the usage of the NSR has generally been low, and has in fact dropped over the years.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the opening up of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for international commercial ships, its 
potential has been often discussed [1] as an alternative shipping passage from Northern Europe to 
Asia, and as a potential competitor to the conventional Suez canal route [2] [3], which can sometimes 
be longer for specific ports and voyage routes connecting Europe to South East Asia [4] [5]. While 
some parts of the NSR were used in the twentieth century by Soviet and Russian ships, it was only in 
the 1990s that it was opened for non-Russian flagged commercial ships [6-93]. In 1997, the Finnish 
oil tanker Uikku became the first non-Russian ship to use the NSR [7-94]. Since then, the route has 
been in use by a variety of ships including tankers and dry cargo ships, and in October 2018, the 3600 
TEU capacity ice class Arc 4 container ship Venta Maersk joined the list of ice class container ships 
after successfully completed a test voyage between Vladivostok, Bremerhaven, Saint-Petersburg and 
Busan using the Northern Sea Route [8-6] [-9-7] [10-8]. This has rekindled speculation and debate on 
the popularity, potential and viability of the NSR, especially in light of the melting of arctic ice, 
climate change and other factors [11-9].  
However, while modelling and future projections play an important role in analysing the usage of the 
NSR, and extensive research has been done in attempting to analyse the potential of NSR as a viable 
option, critical gaps still remain in forming an objective analysis that is based on actual transits that 
have occurred through the NSR using empirical data, vis a vis modelling and future projections. 
Strategies that have been used or can be used by ship owners have been discussed in depth in the past, 
including quantitative analyses [12-81][13-82][14-83][15-84][16-85], however to be fully and 
continuously realised and assessed, they need to be continuously be compared with current empirical 
data and historic long term trends.  Recent studies of traffic statistics have been carried out using 
various means of data collection including the use of AIS tracks (Automatic identification system) 
[17-86] and destination analysis [18-87]. Each of these have their merits and limitations, and suggest 
that while overall transits have increased over the short term, this increase has not always been 
appreciable in quantum, and further studies are needed, especially focussing on specific vessel and 
trade types. In this paper, we add to this existing analysis and discussion by using empirical data from 
the Center for High North Logistics (CHNL), one of the largest repositories of northern sea route 
transits using raw data of actual transits that have taken place in the seven year period from 2011-
2017 to judge how traffic has actually transpired. We also thereafter attempt to analyse possible 
reasons for our findings, which we hope will add to the discussion and enable academics to assess 
future possibilities as well as limitations of the NSR. 
1.1. Commercial transits through Northern Sea Route: 
While the NSR was already in use, this usage remained sparse, sporadic and focussed on coastal 
shipping [19-88][20-89][21-90]. This changed in 2010 when larger ships began to undertake voyages 
through the NSR with increasing frequency. In August 2010, the Russian flagged 114,564 tonnes dwt 
Aframax tanker SCF Baltica (IMO 9305568) became the first Aframax ship to transit the NSR. Soon 
thereafter, the first non-Russian commercial bulk carrier Nordic Barents used NSR to transport iron 
ore from Sydvaranger Gruve, Kirkenes to Lianyungang China [22-10][23-11][24-12]. Both of these 
were experimental voyages. In 2011, the NSR was subsequently opened by the NSR authorities for 
regular ocean going merchant vessels with the maiden voyage of the Singapore flagged tanker 
Perseverance [25-13]. In September 2011, a new record was set by the 160,000 dwt Suezmax tanker 
Vladimir Tikhonov when it used the NSR to carry its cargo of gas condensate from Murmansk to Map 
Ta Phut, Thailand. The shorter (vis a vis Suez Canal) 2,200 nautical miles voyage took 7.5 days to 
complete, at an average speed of 12.2 knots, thus leading to further speculation on a possible 
increased usage of this sea route [26-14].  This was followed by the epic 2012 voyage of the ice class 
1A bulk carrier Sanko Odyssey, carrying 70,000 tonnes of iron ore from Murmansk, Russia, using one 
ice breaker as an escort [27-15].  
This has catalyzed the discussion about the NSR being an alternative, potentially even replacing the 
Suez canal for ships sailing between ports in North Europe to China, Japan and South Korea, the 
salient debate citing it being comparatively shorter than the conventional Suez canal route by up to 
45%, which could result in bunker savings of around US $ 600,000 assuming a daily consumption of 
50-60 tonnes [-28-16] [29-17].  Other factors cited to promote the use of NSR include the lowering of 
NSR transit tariffs in 2011, the avoidance of piracy prone areas in the Malacca straits, Yemen and 
Somalia, the establishment of new ports in the Arctic including the port of Sabetta and new projects 
including the Yamal LNG project off Kara sea, which are expected to increase vessel traffic [3018]. 
The Yamal LNG project alone is expected to produce 360 billion cubic meters of LNG from 32 fields 
in the Yamal peninsula [3119]. The development of existing ports in the Russian Arctic as well as 
increased ore production in the vicinity of Murmansk could lead shippers to prefer this route. There 
are 17 Russian ports along the arctic basin with 112 berths, 11.7% of whose cargo is currently under 
cabotage. Of these, four ports handle 83.8% of the cargo from Russia, namely Murmansk, 
Arkhangelsk, Kandalaksha and Vitino [3220].  
On the other hand, a number of factors act as deterrents for the use of this sea route. The NSR has 
traditionally been avoided by merchant ships due to a number of reasons. These include the presence 
of hazardous ice conditions most of the year, the lack of adequate search and rescue facilities for the 
odd but probably maritime emergency, the high cost of insurance, the virtual necessity for ships to be 
strengthened to ice class to minimize damage and inadequate maritime infrastructure and ports in the 
vicinity, all of which increase risks and costs [3321] [3422] [3523]. The NSR is technically ice free 
for only half the year. Even when said to be technically ‘ice free’, the NSR still can contain pieces of 
ice floes covering less than one eights of the sea surface, thus qualifying as ‘ice free’, yet still being 
dangerous to navigation. The necessity of ice breakers or ice strengthening can increase costs, and a 
vessel beset by ice can lose valuable voyage time.   
Meanwhile, from 2011 to 2018, reports have appeared regularly in maritime publications about 
various “first voyages through the NSR” elucidating the perceived advantages mentioned 
earlier[3624]. These include the maiden voyage of the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 
in 2012 [3725] and the October 2018 transit of the heavy lift ship Tasmanic Winter which crossed the 
NSR for the first time, while en route China to Rotterdam, itself loaded with 24 new boats [3826]. 
Increased funding allocations for projects in the vicinity of the NSR such as the Yamal LNG project 
have the potential to increase NSR transits. In 2014, it was reported that the Russian government 
planned to invest 910 million Roubles (US $ 26 million) for establishing ten search and rescue centers 
along its Arctic coast. In June 2015, under Russia’s newly unveiled “Integrated development plan for 
the northern sea route 2015-30”, further feasibility studies were instituted and announcements of 
development were made [3927]. In October 2018, the CHNL reported federal development projects 
along the NSR estimated at 587.5 billion Roubles [4028]. These declarations have led to spurts in 
enthusiasm for the NSR.  
 
1.2. Aims  and objectives  
 
Most current published research relates to the potential usage of NSR vis a vis actual usage. Studies 
by Wang et al. [2], Stephenson et al. [4129] and Khon et al.[4230] are based on projections, discrete 
choice and logit models. In 2009, Verni and Grigentin analysed the possibility of the usage of NSR 
for container shipping [4331]. In 2010, Liu and Kronbak discussed the potential of NSR in terms of 
its economic viability, in a predictive study before regular transits actually began [4432]. Schoyen 
and Brathen too compared NSR to the Suez Canal from the perspective of bulk carriers [4533] while  
Yumashev et al. [4634] estimated that up to 5% of world trade could be shipped using the NSR.  
However, while projections continue to be made regarding NSR usage, there is need for more updated 
research on actual transits that have taken place and empirical data that can be used to affirm or verify 
these projections and predictions. In this, a number of more recent studies have taken into account 
traffic statistics from various steams including AIS tracking [1281][1382]. However, this needs to be 
constantly updated and compared with trends and projections in order to gain a wholesome view, in 
absence of which a large lacunae can exist in our understanding of the NSR. This study aims to 
address tis by adding to our current repository of knowledge, question earlier held beliefs and attempt 
to answer some of the questions with respect to reasons for the low transit statistics.  
Similarly, while rhetoric about the NSR and its perceived economic benefits are abundant in the 
maritime news and world media, with proclamations of new heights being reached [4735], 
“demonstration voyages” and “experimental voyages” using the NSR are regularly engaged in each 
year [4836][4937][5038] and news articles continuously claim that shipping through the NSR is 
increasing [5139] [5240]. This leads to the question, what is the evidence to suggest that shipping 
through NSR is increasing, and if it is, how much? While there has been analysis of traffic statistics 
over two year periods, there is limited academic research and analysis on the actual quantum of ship 
transits, vessel types and associated details over a longer period. This presents an impediment to the 
serious researcher. Current research suggests that the number of transits have increased but not 
dramatically. However expectations and projections continue to show an upward trend. We ask the 
fundamental question, is this expectation rational and supported by empirical data? Have transit 
numbers increased, decreased or have they remained steady over the past few years? Have they 
matched expectations, superseded them or under-performed? Which vessel types have used the NSR 
more often and which of them have not used them much? Are there any trends that are noticeable? 
Currently, there is need for additional analysis of empirical data to answer these important and 
pertinent questions. Hence there is a need for serious further study regarding transit statistics, trend 
analysis and identification of the types of ships that have actually used the NSR.  
There is need to add to the current research on how the statistics of NSR transits compare to its rival, 
the Suez Canal to address the question whether the perceived rivalry is justified and if its future 
potential as an alternative is substantiated by current statistics of its usage.  
 
This paper addresses these requirements for knowledge by analyzing empirical data of actual NSR 
vessel transits for each year, from 2011 to 2017. We carry out this analysis first by collating existing 
raw data on NSR transits, and compiling annual transit statistics based on these. Further, we organize 
this data as per vessel type, and compare it for each year in this seven year period from 2011 to 2017 
to identify if there are any trends in NSR usage. We compare the annual transit numbers to the days 
that NSR was “open for business” to identify it the two are correlated, potentially identifying if a 
further melting of polar ice might lead to any increase in transits. Finally, we compare the number of 
NSR transits that have taken place to the transits during the same period through the Suez Canal.  
 
2. Material and Methods 
 
2.1. Data 
 
To find answers to the above stated questions, we collated and analysed raw transit data from the 
publicly available database ARCTIS (Arctic Resources and Transportation Information System) 
[5341] [5442] and datasets therein, created and maintained  by the Northern Sea Route Center for 
High North Logistics (CHNL) Information Office. These statistics contain publicly available data 
on all NSR transits that have occurred over the 7 year period from 2011 to 2017, as published by 
the NSR CHNL Information Office and NORD university [5543][5644][5745][5846] [5947]. 
 
The above data is itself sourced from four entities, namely the Northern Sea Route 
Administration (NSRA) a Russian federal state budgetary institution which provides the 
permission and logistics for NSR transits [6048], Atomflot, a Russian federal state unitary 
enterprise that owns and operates nuclear powered ice breakers that operate in the NSR and 
provide ice breaking services, towage, salvage as well as arctic cruises [6149], the Arctic and 
Antarctic Research Institute, an organization located in St. Petersburg and operating  under the 
Russian federal service for hydrometeorology and environmental monitoring [6250] and Ice 
Pilots, an entity founded by the Murmansk shipmasters association which provides pilotage for 
NSR transits [6351].  
The primary source of vessel types was the vessel designations recorded in the above databases. 
Where there were ambiguities or where information on vessel types was missing in the original 
CHNL dataset, this was augmented from the worldwide vessel database of equasis  
which is supported by the European commission, and maritime administrations of France, 
Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, Japan, P&I clubs and  classification societies [6452], and the 
TRIS and ITRD databases for tugs and offshore vessels [6553]. For the purpose of this research, 
we use the definition of an NSR transit as defined by the regulations of Russian federation, 
Arctic council and NSRA. The Arctic council defines the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as “…the 
sea route from Northern Europe to South East Asia passing along the Northern coast of the 
Russian Federation…” [6654][6755]. The NSRA further defines NSR as “shipping within the 
areas between the Cape Dezhnev and the Kara Gate and Cape Zhelaniya or the strait between the 
Cape and Franz Josef Land” [6856]. As per Art. 5.1 of Russian Federal Law dated 30 April 1999 
amended by N-132 FZ dated 28 July 2012, this consist of the region bound by the 68 35 East 
longitude on the western edge along the north eastern part of Kara sea and extends up to 168 
58’37” West on the eastern edge along Chukchi sea [6957] [7058].  
 
2.2. Organization and Analysis 
We collated and organized this raw data into (a) Aggregate transit data per year [table 1] and (b) 
transit data per year per vessel type [table 4].  
 
Year 
Total 
Transits 
First transit 
(dd.mm.yyyy) 
Last transit 
(dd.mm.yyyy) 
NSR 
open   
2011 41 29.06.2011       
2012 46 23.06.2012 18.11.2012 148 days 
2013 71 28.06.2013 28.11.2013 153 days 
2014 53 28.06.2014 17.11.2014 142 days 
2015 18 30.07.2015 10.12.2015 133 days 
2016 18 16.07.2016 17.11.2016 124 days 
2017 27 31.08.2017 6.12.2017 97 days 
 
Table 1. Aggregate NSR transit data per year for the period 2011-2017 
To compare vessel types, we further grouped the data on vessel transits into five categories, 
namely Category 1-5 [table 2]. We created these categories based on the vessel types and 
cargoes that they carried, to test the hypothesis of whether there might exist a correlation 
between vessel cargoes / trades and usage of NSR. 
 
Category 1 Tankers (Chemical, Product, Oil) and LNG 
Category 2 Dry cargo ships: Bulk carrier, General cargo, Reefer and Container  
Category 3 Passenger and Cruise ships, Seismic, Research and Hydrographic ships 
Category 4 
Ice breakers, Tugs, Offshore support and supply vessels (OSV), Diving ship, 
Salvage and Rescue vessel 
Category 5 Coast guard and fishing vessels 
 
Table 2. Categories of vessels using NSR. 
 
These specific categories were chosen for three reasons. Firstly, due to the common practice in 
the maritime field of grouping ships by the type of cargo carried and the purpose of ships  
[7159] [7260]. Secondly, the manner in which original raw data is published by the CHNL 
allowed these vessel types to be clearly identified. Thirdly, trade patterns in these broad 
categories will enable observers and researchers to identify specific trends related to specific 
industries related to their study and correlate it to specific projects that are currently in progress 
in the Northern Arctic and that might arise in the future. 
 
2.3. Limitations  
During our research, we have been cognizant of the fact that there are limitations to the data 
presented in ARCTIS by the CHNL. While the organization is the central repository of all 
transits through the NSR, it is also a commercial organization involved in the promotion of the 
NSR, thus there may exist an inherent conflict of interest. Classifications of vessel types has 
varied in CHNL statistics in 2011, 2012 and 2013 after which the vessel classifications have 
remained the same. Hence we cross checked vessel types and tonnages for the vessel name and 
IMO number (where available) using the database of the IMO (International Maritime 
Organisation), Equasis and Det Norske Veritas, thus addressing any errors in spelling. We have 
also double checked press releases from companies, to ensure that only those transits that 
actually transpired are included in the data. CHNL only records transits that pass through all the 
transit points along the NSR, hence many vessel movements that do not pass all the transit points 
(for example, movements of offshore vessels that undertake voyages from a port near NSR to an 
oil rig in the Russian EEZ and return thereafter to the same port) are often not included in their 
statistics, neither are short sea coastal voyages and voyages undertaken without pilots. In reading 
our research findings, these factors must be given due cognizance. Furthermore, three distinct 
limitations of data that we felt need elucidation have been discussed in depth below, which must 
be kept in mind when analyzing the given data and research. 
  
3. Results 
3.1. Usage of NSR and Transit Statistics 
We find that transit numbers have not been as flattering as the press coverage would initially 
have suggested. A total of 274 ship transits took place through the NSR during the seven year 
period from 2011-17, an average of 39 transits per year [table 1 and 2]. 2013 saw the highest 
number of transits to date (71) after which they have reduced to a low of 18 in 2015 and 2016, 
increasing slightly to 27 in 2017.  
 
 
Table 3. Overview of ship transits 2011-2017. 
 
 
3.2. Profile of vessels using the NSR 
We assimilated data of vessel types using Categories 1,2,3,4 and 5 based on the type of ship and 
the nature of its trade and cargo, in order to give a more representative image of the nature of 
vessels that, data would indicate, favour usage of the NSR. Data shows that NSR has been most 
“popular” with Categories 1 and 2 ships (categories as described in the previous section), namely 
tankers and dry cargo, which combined accounted for 81% of the ships. 44% of them were 
“Category 1 ships” (Tankers: chemical, product and oil and LNG) and 37% of them were bulk 
carriers and dry cargo ships including general cargo, reefer and occasionally, container ships 
(“Category 2 ships”).  
 
 
Table 4. Categories of vessels using NSR. 
 
“Category 3 ships”, consisting of ice breakers, tugs, offshore vessels, supply ships, diving, 
salvage and rescue vessels accounted for 12% of the total traffic. The number of cruise ships that 
have used the NSR has been low, accounting for just 5% of the total traffic along with seismic, 
research and hydrographic vessels. Coast guard and fishing vessels accounted for just 2% of the 
total traffic.  
 
However, the preponderance of tankers has not been a steady trend. While they were the 
dominant vessel type in 2011-14, it was dry cargo ships that were the highest users of NSR from 
2015-17, accounting for half the transits in 2015 and 2016, and for 70% of the transits in 2017.  
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Number of transits 
As shown in Figure 1, from 2011-17, a total of 271 transits took place through the NSR. The 
highest number of transits per year took place in 2013 (71 transits) after which the numbers have 
generally declined.  
In 2011, the first year when commercial transits commenced, 41 transits took place through the 
NSR from 29 June 2011 onwards. Thereafter transit numbers increased to 46 transits (2012) and 
to a peak of 71 transits (2013) which has not been surpassed since. Thereafter the number of 
transits dropped sharply to 53 (2014) and even further to 18 (2015 and 2016). In 2017, there was 
a slight rise to 27 transits. 
 
Figure 1. NSR transits 2011-2012 
 
Thus, based on empirical data, it may thus be surmised that the usage of NSR has generally been 
low, with a high point of 53 transits in 2014 and a subsequent low of 18 transits each for two 
years 2015 and 2016. Contrary to the expectation of increasing NSR transits, data shows us that 
after 2013, transits have generally reduced for 3 years and only increased slightly in 2017 to 27. 
This is still lower than the number of transits in the first year of NSR opening up. 
 
Possible reasons:  
The reasons for this reduction are worth exploring. Prima facie, these reasons could include 
navigational issues (ice), commercial issues, environmental conditions (fog), geographical 
locations of loading and discharge ports, as well as trade related reasons. Unlike container ships 
which base their routes on a hub and spoke logistics model, routes adopted by bulk carriers and 
tankers are purely based on the loading and discharge port. Thus, ships loading in Australia and 
discharging in China always use one of the channels between islands of Indonesia, East Timor 
and Papua New Guinea without touching Singapore straits unless they need to pick up bunkers 
or stores. As of 2019, there are very limited operational ports abundant in loading bulk, oil and 
gas ports along Northern Europe that may be able to compete with other currently prevailing 
ports. This may not change even if fresh mineral deposits are discovered. For example, any new 
coal deposits will have to compete with the prevailing popular coal loading ports of Indonesia 
and Australia, both located just a week of clear waters from China, Japan and South Korea. Even 
if new manganese deposits are discovered along Northern Europe, the NSR would have to 
display merits as compared to the clear deep water oceanic route from Groote Eylandt (the 
largest Manganese loading port of Australia) to S.E. Asia. A similar case exists for Iron ore, 
wherein any route between Northern Europe to S.E. Asia would have to demonstrate itself as 
safe and economical as the current deep water routes from the minerals rich Pilbara region of 
Australia which houses the largest iron ore exporting ports in the world to S.E. Asia, the latter 
being the pivot point of the argument for NSR.  
 
A further detailed examination of the reasons was not within the purview of this research, as this 
is in itself an extensive topic worth a separate detailed study and worth researching. 
 
4.2. Vessel types 
We find that tankers (chemical, product, oil) and LNG were the largest users of NSR for the 
initial four years from 2011-14, accounting for 41% to 61of the total transits. Thereafter their 
share fell compared to dry cargo ships. Dry cargo ships on the other hand have seen their share 
of transits decrease from 34% in 2011 to 22% in 2012. Thereafter they have steadily increased in 
share to 19 transits in 2017 translating to 70% of the total transits for that year. Category 4 ships 
(ice breakers, tugs, off shore supply, search and rescue ships) are the third largest users of the 
NSR, with total 32 transits during the period. Cruise ships and research vessels are a niche 
category that accounted for a total of 15 transits or 12.5% of total transits.  
 
 
Figure 2. Usage of NSR by vessel type. 
 Coast guard and fishing vessels rarely use the NSR for transits, with a grand total of just 5 
transits. The share of tankers using NSR fell to 6% in 2016, with just one tanker transit of the 
Russian flagged product tanker Yaroslav Mudriy in November 2016, carrying 8,470 metric 
tonnes of oil products. As of 2019, under the belt and road initiative of China, pipelines for 
transporting any new oil and gas finds in Russia appear to be a favored solution [7395]. This is 
due to the obvious advantages of such pipeline connectivity, which can be continuous, less 
dependent on the quantum of oil to be transported, and safe from the vagaries of an oceanic 
voyage through ice filled and story waters [7496]. Hence, even in light of any new oil and gas 
explorations and findings, little chance of correlation can be expected with regards to the use of 
NSR. 
 
 
Figure 3. NSR transits 2011-2017. Comparison between different vessel types. 
  
 
4.2.1. Tankers 
 
     
Figure 4. Category 1 - Tanker transits and comparison with total transits. 
The number of tankers that used NSR rose steadily from 17 (2011) to 28 (2012) and 40 in 
2013. Thereafter, numbers fell to 27 (2014). In 2015, only 2 tankers Svyatoy Petr and 
Palladiy used the NSR, and in 2016, only one tanker Yaroslav Mudriy navigated through 
it. This number rose in 2017 to 5 tankers, namely Egvekinot, the LNG carriers Chr. De 
Margerie and Boris Vilkitskiy and two transits by the product tanker Chukotka+. Data 
suggests that while the Yamal LNG project produced 82.8 billion cubic meters of LNG in 
2017 [7561], it has not resulted in any significant increase in the number of tankers using 
NSR. This could be due to the fact that the oil fields at Yamal are also connected by gas 
pipelines that run over land in Russia through Surgut, Vorkhuta, Salekhard, and 
Nizhnevartovsk [7662]. Even though Yamal has not yet reached its full capacity, 
increased LNG production in Yamal need not result an increase in LNG ship traffic in 
NSR. Further, ships continue to be susceptible to the vagaries of nature in this region, 
thus defeating its use. In November 2017, the tanker Chukotka+ attempted to cross the 
NSR without ice breaker assistance, however it got stuck in the ice in Sannikov strait, 
necessitating it to remain beset for a few days until the ice breaker Yamal was able to 
rescue it on 22 November [7763]. Milakovic et al. also conclude that ice conditions will 
be one of the three decisive factors for NSR [7864]. 
 
4.2.2. Bulk carriers, General Cargo and Reefers 
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The number of transits by category 2 ships (dry cargo including bulk carriers, general 
cargo, reefer and container ships) has generally followed a sine curve in its numbers, with a 
currently upward trend. In 2011, 14 bulk carriers transited the NSR, in 2012 this reduced to 
10. In 2013, it increased to 24 dry cargo transits after which it steadily reduced over the next 
two years to 17 (2014) and 9 each in 2015 and 2016. This however accounted for half the 
NSR transits. In 2017, 19 transits took place by dry cargo ships. Of these, very few are 
container ships, and a majority are general cargo ships, reefer and bulk carriers. 2017 saw 
the highest number of dry cargo ships transiting the NSR including 4 heavy lift ships (Tian 
Jian, Da An, Tian Fu and Tian Le), 8 general cargo ships, 3 transits by reefer ships and two 
transits by the pallet ship “Winter Bay”. However, this larger proportion of heavy lift ships, 
and general cargo ships were mostly involved in specific construction projects in the Arctic 
catered to by the companies COSCO and BBC [59]. Hence there is no reason to suggest that 
this trend will necessarily continue in 2018 and thereafter, unless largescale port and island 
construction projects take place in the Arctic.   
 
 
Figure 5. Category 2 - Dry cargo ship transits and comparison with total transits. 
However, these heavy lifts were specifically engaged in port developments, hence it 
would be wrong to expect a repetition of these voyages unless more ports are developed. 
 
4.2.3. Passenger, Cruise, Seismic, Research, Hydrographic vessels (Category 3): 
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The first seismic ship to transit NSR was Polarcus Alima which departed Hammerfest on 
15 September 2011 and arrived at Cape Dezhnev 9 days later completing its a passage of 
3000 nautical miles [11]. However, this category of ships, viz. passenger cruise ships, 
seismic, research and hydrographic vessels has seen unsteady transit numbers, with just 3 
transits  in 2011, none in 2012, 3 in 2013, a maximum of 6 in 2014, a drop to 1 transit in 
2015, 2 in 2016 and none in 2017. These include the 2014 transit by Akademik 
Tryoshnikov, the 2014 and 2016 transits by passenger ship Hanseatic, the 2014 transit by 
passenger ship Kapitan Khlebnikov and the 2015 transit by the Hapag Lloyd expedition 
ship Bremen.  While adventure cruises to the arctic are often advertised among select 
groups of tourists including tours to Baranov station [7965], data shows that they are 
infrequent and have not increased the number of NSR transits significantly. It is of note 
that these expeditions often visit the Arctic, but can remain outside the sea area limits of 
NSR. For example, Bremen has so far transited the NSR only twice, in 2015 and in 
November 2018 [7965].  
 
Figure 6. Category 3 ship transits and comparison with total transits. 
Thus, data suggests that arctic cruises using the NSR remain a niche category, especially 
since reaching the North Pole (a popular aim of many arctic cruises) does not necessitate 
a full transit of the NSR. As of 2019, there were no ships sailing from China, Japan or 
Korea offering arctic cruises.  
 
4.2.4. Icebreaker, tug, offshore support vessel, diving ships, salvage and rescue vessels 
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 Figure 7. Category 4 ship transits and comparison with total transits. 
 
Category 4 ships (ice breakers, tugs, off shore support and supply vessels, diving ships and 
search and rescue vessels) accounted in most years for the third largest number of transits, 
varying from 4% to 33% of the total transits. Their numbers have varied between 8 transits 
(2012) to 1 transit in 2017 by the supply ship Fedor Ushakov. However, ice breakers that 
operate continuously in the NSR without exiting it are not included in the transit statistics 
published by the CHNL, as the latter focusses on transits by commercial ships. This also 
accounts for the fact that data resulting from AIS tracks can vary from that published by 
CHNL. The same ice breaker can also be engaged in servicing a number of ships during the 
same period, depending on their needs. 
 
 
4.2.5. Coastguard and Fishing vessels 
As per NSR transit data, the route is least used by Coast guard and fishing vessels, with 
numbers usually varying between 1 and 0 transit per year, though in 2017, it was used by 
two fishing vessels, Volk Arktiki and Odissey-1. 
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 Figure 8. Category 5 ship transits and comparison with total transits. 
 
4.3. Mitigating factors - Navigation season, and Days open for transits and navigation 
 
Using climatic models and the A1B scenario of the Intergovernmental panel on climate change, 
Khon et al. [8066] conclude that the number of days that the NSR would be usable could most 
probably increase. However, the days when NSR has actually transacted business, as measured 
by the difference between the first transit and last transit dates, has steadily reduced after its peak 
(153 days) in 2013. NSR itself has been open for transits for varying durations throughout the 
observation time period of 2011-17. Though studies have indicated increased melting of polar 
ice caps, the number of days that the NSR was used for transits (measured as the difference 
between the first and last transits) has varied between 148 days in 2012 and 153 days in 2013, to 
a steadily reducing 142 days (2014), 133 days (2015), 124 days (2016) and just 97 days (2017). 
Current transit statistics do not indicate any increase in the number of days NSR was open with 
any increased melting of arctic ice. Having said that, this measure of “days open for business” 
also depends on the ships lined up for transits.  
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 Figure 9. Number of days NSR was open (2012-2017) 
 
It is noteworthy to mention here that the NSR is not open for navigation throughout the year 
[8167]. During the Arctic winter, NSR is covered with thick ice preventing any navigation. The 
navigation season commences in June each year, as ice thins down and can be broken by 
conventional ice breakers and ice class ships [table 2 NSR open days and first last transit].  
While some navigation does take place from February to March in Barents Sea, none takes place 
in Kara Sea and Laptev Sea in the vicinity of Taimyr Peninsula due to thick ice [8268]. The last 
transits of the season are usually towards the end of November / beginning of December. To 
analyse the given data, we measured the number of days NSR was open, as the difference 
between the first transit and last transit. 
 
NSR was open for navigation for a maximum duration in 2013 (5.1 months or 153 days). In all 
other years, this period has been lesser, consistently reducing since 2013, to 142 days (2014), 
133 days (2015), 124 days (2016) and the lowest so far of 97 days in 2017. While there have 
been reports in 2015 that NSR could potentially be open for navigation all year long, current 
transit data does not support this supposition [8369].  
 Figure 10. NSR 2012-2017: Days open vs number of transits. 
 
4.3.1. Ice free waters 
 
The Polar Code (regulation 2.5) and the WMO sea ice nomenclature define “ice free waters” as 
“…waters where there is no ice present. If ice of any kind is present, this term shall not be used.”  
[8470] [8571]. However, while reports are often encountered referring to the NSR being 
generally ice free during certain times of the year and thus speculating independent transits by 
ships that are not ice strengthened [8672] [8773], this can be misleading as the term “ice free” is 
a misnomer and does not mean free of ice. It may contain very open or brash ice (polynya), 
[8874] as well as drift ice [8975], making navigation by non-ice class ships virtually impossible, 
and making the assistance of ice breakers often necessary even for ice class ships. Simulations 
and studies by Bekkers et al. [9076] suggest that the polar ice caps might be melting faster than 
earlier envisaged, however, our study suggests that this has not resulted in any increase in NSR 
transits. On the contrary, any presence of ice, even if it is in small quantities has three major 
impacts on transits, namely an increase in transit costs due to ice breaker escorts, higher 
premiums for insurance coverage and lower permissible speeds, thus defeating any saving in 
distance.   
 
4.4. Comparison with Suez canal 
The number of transits through NSR are very few compared to Suez Canal [table …]. They were 
just 0.10 - 0.43% of Suez Canal transits from 2011-17. In 2013, NSR saw 71 transits while Suez 
Canal saw 16,595 transits [9177] [9278]. The Suez Canal is open for navigation all year long, 
while NSR has been open only for 153 to 97 days each year.  
Year 
NSR 
Transits 
Suez canal 
Transits 
NSR Transits / 
month 
Suez canal 
Transits / month 
2011 41 17800     
2012 46 17224 9 1435 
2013 71 16595 14 1383 
2014 53 17148 11 1429 
2015 18 17483 4 1457 
2016 18 16833 5 1403 
2017 27 17550 8 1463 
Table. Comparison between number of transits of NSR and Suez Canal (2011-2017). 
 
Even after considering this variation, we find that the per month transits for NSR are 1/159th those 
of Suez Canal in 2011 (0.6289%) and 1/183th the number in 2017.  Based on the data, it is 
improbable that the NSR will prove to be a competition for the Suez Canal any time soon. 
 
4.5. Limitations of data  
We identified three additional limitations in the raw data published by CHNL. To ensure 
that this does not adversely impact our research, we took the following precautions. 
 
4.5.1. Data included in Annual statistics  
 
CHNL listed every vessel’s name and flag for each transit. However, the level of detail of 
other information provided for each ship has not been consistent each year. For transits of 
2011, data on vessel types only mentioned categories – tanker, bulker, refrigerator (sic.), 
container, general cargo, ice breaker, diving ship, cruiser, towing boat, seismic research 
vessel, hydrographical vessel and tug/supply ship. In 2012 and 2013, the vessel type was 
not mentioned at all, only the cargo carried during the transit was mentioned. This could 
occasionally be confusing as “FD” (Fuel diesel) has been listed as cargo, making two 
surmises possible, a tanker with FD as cargo as well as a general cargo ship carrying 
diesel fuel as bunkers. Occasionally, bulk carriers have been mistakenly written as MT, 
for example: Nordic Orion in ballast has been given the prefix MT when in actuality it is 
a bulk carrier. Yuri Topchev is referred to as a multi-function vessel while it is registered 
as a tug in other maritime databases [9379]. Occasionally ships have been categorized as 
“Coast guard” in one year and “Border Guard” in another (for example: PS-824 is 
categorized as a “Border guard vessel” in 2011 and PS-825 is categorized as “Coast 
Guard service” in 2013). Similarly, the CHNL statistics do not always specify the vessel 
type for each ship. For example the CHNL data for the August 2013 transit of Tekhnolog 
Konyukhov does not list its vessel type. In 2016, CHNL classified oil tankers also as 
general cargo ships (example: the oil products tanker Yaroslav Mvdryy IMO IMO 
9046576 10,463 dwt is recorded in the 2016 CHNL NSRLIO statistics as a general cargo 
carrier with oil products as its cargo.  
In all such cases, we cross checked the vessel type from three alternative sources, namely 
the Equasis vessel data registry [www.equasis.org], marine traffic 
[www.marinetraffic.com website] and vessel finder [www.vesselfinder.com] and 
tabulated the vessel type relevant to the voyage. Where available, open data bases of 
DNV and classification societies were also used to iron out any such doubts. 
 
4.5.2. Inconsistencies in data related to ice breakers and cruise ships 
 
Secondly, the same vessel has sometimes been registered in the statistics alternately as 
Icebreaker, Passenger ship and cruise vessel. This is because some ice breakers are 
multipurpose in their capabilities. They can also function as cruise ships for specialty 
novelty arctic cruises, as well as for hydrographic purposes. For example: Russia’s 
nuclear ice breakers Arktika and Taimyr are also employed for arctic cruises. So are 
Hanseatic, Kapitan Khlebnikov, Akademik Tryoshnikov [9480].  
 
In such cases, we have recorded the vessel exactly as listed by the CHNL. Similarly in 
2016, Kapitan Khlebnikov’s type is recorded by the NSRLIO as “icebreaker” but its 
cargo is recorded as passenger. In such cases, we have recorded the vessel type based on 
the purpose of the transit. 
 
4.5.3. Missing / unspecified data  
The level of detail of data published each year by the CHNL has been different. There 
has not been any standardization over the years. For example: the statistics published for 
2011 were basic, and did not have any dates of entry into and exit from NSR. Hence it 
was not possible to account for the number of days that the NSR was open in 2011. 
We addressed this by only reporting on data that has either been consistently published 
each year, or which could be verified by other means. For 2015, 2016 and 2017, 
additional vessel types like “Heavy lift” were added.  In 2014, CHNL included tugs, 
supply vessels and ice breakers all under one category “tug/supply/icebreaker”. We have 
addressed this by choosing the broad categories listed in 2.2 to erase any errors due to 
ambiguity. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The success of NSR as a worthwhile navigation option and even as an alternative to Suez Canal, for 
shipments between Northern Europe and the East Asia can be measured by analyzing the number of 
transits that have taken place through the NSR. In our research, we analyzed the data from transits 
through NSR from 2011 to 2017. However, the data and our study of the transits during this seven 
year period shows that transit numbers have consistently remained very low. While they did increase 
from 2011 to 2013, these numbers were always less than 71 per year, dipping to a low of just 18 
transits in the years 2015 and 2016. This shows that the route has not been as popular with shippers 
and ship owners as was projected. The reasons for this have already been enumerated above, and 
include the high risk, the limited days that NSR is truly open for business, high costs and high risks. 
 
Furthermore, data shows that any comparison between NSR and Suez Canal is unfounded. NSR 
barely registers 0.4 % of the number of transits that Suez canal is used for, as the latter registered 
16,595 transits in 2013 while the NSR registered a mere 71. Ships that have used the NSR are mostly 
tankers and dry cargo ships, with specific ports whose locations necessitate the use of NSR or single 
demonstration voyages for test purposes.  
 
Any increase in the use of NSR, even in recent years, has been limited to very few ship numbers. This 
is due to a multitude of reasons, including the presence of ice, navigational dangers, fog which 
restricts visibility, inadequately surveyed waters and charts, inadequate presence of search and rescue 
facilities, extreme harsh weather, added costs of insurance, additional pilotage and ice breaker 
assistance. Even for voyages between the Northern extremities of China and Northern Europe, there 
is no data to suggest that NSR is being used. The few ships that do get publicized in the maritime 
media and press releases like Xue Long in 2012 and Tasmanic Winter in 2018 are primarily one off 
experimental and exhibition / demonstration voyages. The quantities of cargo that would necessitate 
the use of NSR or justify the additional costs are currently not present in the Russian Arctic. 
Container ships have hence rarely used the NSR since 2011 due to the lack of any hub ports along the 
Northern coast of Russia. Current empirical data does not suggest any reason for any major change in 
this trend.  
 
Though environmental studies have suggested that the polar caps have been melting, leading to an 
increase in “ice free waters” in the arctic, the number of days that the NSR has been “open for 
business” as actually reduced, from 148 days in 2012 and 153 days in 2013, to 142 days (2014), 133 
days (2015), 124 days (2016) and just 97 days (2017). This suggests that the number of ice free days 
has actually reduced consistently. Further, even if the presence of ice reduces, there is no data to 
suggest that the NSR will become a popular route option for shippers any time soon. 
The only exception might be LNG shipments between Russian Arctic and China, but at the moment, 
there are few such shipments or loading ports. Further, the use of pipelines to transport this gas is a 
far more popular, safer and viable option. Thus, it will take a considerable time before the NSR can 
be discussed as a viable option for shipments between Northern Europe and the far Eastern nations of 
Asia, including China, Japan and Korea. 
 
In addition to the above, the reasons for the reluctance to use NSR could be multifold and are worth 
further exploring. The exact impact that could occur if LNG trade between Russian Arctic increases is 
also worth exploring, but necessitates further data. Until then, NSR remains a niche route, and is 
expected to remain so. Its transit numbers are also too small for it to be a significant competition for 
the Suez Canal for the time being. 
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